Lieder & Griffiths (2020) cite Chater & Oaksford's 1999 retrospective, not Anderson (1990) alone, when naming 'rational analysis' as the paradigm resource-rational analysis extends

resource-rationalityrational-analysisoaksford-chaterandersoncognitive-sciencecitation-networkhistory-of-psychology

Introducing the parent paradigm, Lieder & Griffiths write that Anderson (1990) "developed the idea of understanding human cognition as a rational adaptation to environmental structure and goals pursued within it, creating a cognitive modeling paradigm known as rational analysis (Chater & Oaksford 1999)." Their reference list resolves this citation to Chater, N. & Oaksford, M. (1999), "Ten years of the rational analysis of cognition," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3(2):57–65 — the same paper already in the vault as a directly-read Tier-1 primary (claim-chater-oaksford-1999-list-marr-integration-as-outstanding-question), which itself records that Chater & Oaksford's piece thanks Anderson for discussion in its acknowledgements.

The vault already knew resource-rational analysis "self-describes as a direct extension of Anderson's rational analysis" (claim-resource-rational-analysis-extends-andersons-rational-analysis). This sharpens that. At the one place in the target article where the paradigm is formally introduced — the history-of-rationality section, where Anderson is named as the person who created it — the citation hung on the name "rational analysis" is not Anderson's 1990 book but Chater & Oaksford's 1999 retrospective on it. The scope matters: elsewhere in the same article the term is cited to Anderson (1990) alone, twice, in the introduction's list of frameworks and in the sentence calling rational analysis the most influential of them. So the claim is not that Lieder & Griffiths always route the name through Chater & Oaksford — it is that at the paradigm's formal introduction they do. Half of the "Oaksford & Chater" partnership behind the Wason-task recast is cited there as a co-definer of the paradigm's name, not merely as an independent later application of it.